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Abstract
We study the impact of service attributes (warranty length, after-sales service qual-
ity) on consumer demand in the U.S. automobile industry, examining the presence of
complementarities/substitution between service attributes and product quality. Our
results estimate a median willingness to pay for one year of warranty of about $850,
which is equivalent to 3.1% of the median vehicle price in our sample. We find that,
for a car with median characteristics, the effect on consumer utility of a 1% price de-
crease is equivalent, all else being equal, to increasing product quality by 2.2%, and is
in turn equivalent to increasing the warranty length by 8%. Our results also indicate
that service attributes play a compensatory role with respect to product quality, i.e.,
the impact of warranty length and service quality on demand increases when product
quality decreases. Conversely, both service metrics are complementary with respect to
demand, i.e., the better the service quality, the higher the marginal effect of longer
warranties. Our results thus imply that, in our period of analysis, warranties played
a more important role for American firms than for foreign firms, consistent with the
fact that American manufacturers exhibited lower product quality and higher service
quality than non-American firms.
Keywords: Services in manufacturing, demand models, competition, automobiles,
econometrics
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1. Motivation
A fundamental trend in manufacturing industries is the movement from a “pure manufactur-
ing”paradigm to a business model in which a central role is assigned to the service component
of products based on the value they provide to consumers (Cohen et al. 2006). The move-
ment towards a service-based economy has coincided with this change and has encouraged
many manufacturing firms to put more emphasis on the delivery of services associated with
their product offerings (Shankar et al. 2009). It has been reported that the sales of after-
sales services and spare parts represent 8% of the annual gross domestic product in the U.S.
(Cohen et al. 2006). In short, services have become an important part of an OEM’s com-
petitive strategy in traditional manufacturing industries. While existing models of product
differentiation in manufacturing industries have provided some insights in explaining the con-
sequences of pricing and other product characteristics on demand, they have mostly ignored
the impact of services. This paper takes a step in addressing this issue, by formulating an
empirical model to analyze the role of services as part of a firm’s competitive strategy in
the U.S. automobile industry, and the joint effect that service attributes and product quality
have on consumer demand.
The automobile industry has served as a preferred setting for empirical studies on product
differentiation (e.g. Berry et al. 1995 and 2004, Sudhir 2001, Train and Winston 2007, among
many others), and constitutes a natural choice for our research. We focus on services during
the in-warranty period. In particular, we measure the service dimension of a brand by
the length of its warranty, along with a metric of the after-sales service quality delivered
during the in-warranty period. The length of the warranty defines the period in which
repair services are provided by the OEM as part of the value that consumers obtain with
the purchase of the car, and therefore is a managerial decision that partially reflects the
service intensity provided by OEM1. Firms have been active in adjusting the length of their
warranties in the last decade: Ford, Chevrolet, Acura, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Audi and Kia
are just some examples of brands that have increased the length of their warranties in that
period. For example, Ford increased their powertrain warranty from 3 years/36,000 miles to
5 years/60,000 miles in 2007. In the words of a spokeperson from Ford when asked about the
reasons behind the warranty length increase: “We think that some people weren’t considering
Ford products because we didn’t have an extended powertrain warranty versus some of our
competition. We hope that it will increase our competitiveness... We think that customers
do want it, and do care about it” (Warranty Week 2006). On the other hand, Chrysler
1We refer to the warranty length as a service attribute because it directly determines the length of the
period over which services are delivered and paid for by the manufacturer. It can also be seen as a product
attribute that is related to insurance.
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and Volkswagen both decreased their warranty length at least once during the same period.
Indeed, company sources have suggested that the increase in warranty length by Chrysler for
the 2008 model year “wasn’t as valuable to consumers as we might have hoped” (Automotive
News 2009), and as a result the company cut it back in 2009.
Firms face an important trade-off when defining their warranty period: while longer
warranties may potentially increase product demand, they also generate significant costs.
For U.S.-based automakers, these costs have typically been in the range of $10 billion per
year, which represents roughly 2-4% of their yearly revenue (Warranty Week 2011). This
discussion reflects the importance of improving our understanding of the conditions under
which warranties and service attributes influence demand.
In this paper we formulate and estimate a model to measure the impact of service at-
tributes on consumer demand in the U.S. automobile industry. Combining data from multiple
sources, we propose an empirical model using market-level data for new light cars sold in the
U.S. between 2001 and 2007. Our analysis is based on demand formulation that incorporates
the two aforementioned variables to characterize firm service strategies, i.e. warranty length
and the quality of after-sales service. Our results provide new evidence to explain the influ-
ence of warranty length and service quality on the demand for a given model, relative to the
influence of other characteristics such as price and product quality. Most existing empirical
models of competition in this and other industries deal with the endogeneity of prices while
assuming that all other characteristics in the demand specification are exogenous. Our model
is different in that we not only endogenize pricing but also the warranty length decision. We
do so by generating instruments based on the factors driving firm decision-making for the
warranty length. Our findings indicate that, when the endogeneity of warranties is consid-
ered, there is a significant effect of warranty length on demand, while service quality does
not have a significant effect when this variable is considered in isolation.
We also investigate complementarities and substitution effects between warranty length,
service quality and product quality, by conducting a systematic analysis to understand the
joint influence of service attributes and product quality on consumer demand. We propose
that warranty length, service quality and product quality, interact in a non-trivial way in the
consumer’s value function, and we investigate the nature of these interactions. In particular,
we test whether the effect of service attributes on consumer demand is independent of,
or is a complement or substitute for product quality. The theory of compensatory effects
in consumer decision-making (e.g. Dieckmann et al. 2009) support the hypothesis that
both dimensions act as substitutes, i.e., good service serves the purpose of compensating
consumers for poor product quality. Alternatively, service attributes could be complements
with product quality if consumers see both dimensions as reinforcing their brand preference,
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i.e., if the primary effect of offering good product quality and good service is to create better
brand image.
Our results indicate that the value that consumers derive from warranty length and
service quality in the U.S. automobile industry increases when product quality decreases, i.e.
service attributes have a bigger impact on demand when product quality is low, providing
evidence for a compensatory rather than a complementary role of services relative to product
quality. Similarly, we test whether both service attributes have independent, complementary
or substitution effects on demand, and find evidence for a complementary relationship in
this case. This suggests that a firm that increases its warranty length would make the most
out of this investment (in terms of its impact on demand) by simultaneously investing in
providing better service quality.
The results of our analysis thus indicate that the joint consideration of product and
service is essential for the development of an effective competitive strategy.
2. Related Literature
Service competition is a major topic of interest in operations management (OM). In tra-
ditional service industries, theoretical models have examined competition when consumer
demand depends on price and service levels (So 2000, Cachon and Harker 2002, Allon and
Federgruen 2007, Bernstein and Federgruen 2007), and in empirical OM research several
studies have tested some of these and related theories in, e.g., the fast food industry (Allon
et al. 2011) and the banking industry (Buell et al. 2014). In manufacturing industries, in
contrast, service competition has been the subject of theoretical models in OM, e.g., service
competition between a manufacturer and a retailer (Cohen and Whang 1997), between re-
tailers that interact strategically with a manufacturer (Tsay and Agrawal 2000), and between
manufacturers (Lu et al. 2011). The empirical evidence in the case of manufacturing indus-
tries, however, is scarce, and indeed we are not aware of any OM papers that analyze the
impact of service competition on consumer demand in manufacturing industries empirically.
In the economics literature, on the other hand, theoretical models of product differenti-
ation (e.g. Shaked and Sutton 1982, Caplin and Nalebuff 1991), have prompted numerous
empirical studies, especially in the automobile industry where researchers have studied dif-
ferent aspects of firm competition and consumer demand (e.g. Berry et al. 1995, Train and
Winston 2007, among many others). Similar to the OM literature, these economic models
of demand have omitted the role of supporting services by automakers.
Our paper thus attempts to fill this gap by analyzing the role of service attributes as
drivers of consumer demand in the U.S. automobile industry. Moreover, as our results illus-
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trate, considering the interaction between service attributes and product quality is essential
in order to disentangle the effects of service attributes on demand in this industry, and thus
analyzing service competition in a manufacturing industry offers new evidence that goes
beyond what has been done in service industries. One particular advantage that is gained
by incorporating product and service dimensions into a single analysis is that it allows us
to examine the existence of complementarities and substitution effects. As we discuss in
the paper, we are not aware of other papers that have looked at studying such interaction
effects in a competitive market. We believe this novel feature of our model also connects
operations variables related to quality to the competitive strategy of the firm which includes
product/service bundle positioning. Further, some survey-based studies in the automobile
industry have suggested that service quality plays a role in determining customer satisfaction
and brand loyalty (e.g., Mittal et al. 1999, Devaraj et al. 2001), but we are not aware of
research that focuses on the impact of service attributes on consumer demand in manufac-
turing industries and in a competitive context, and how that effect of service attributes on
demand depends on characteristics of the product.
One of the service variables we focus on is length of warranty. Four main rationales re-
garding the economic role of warranties have been proposed in the literature (see e.g. Emons
1989 for a comprehensive discussion): protection against product failures (insurance role),
provision of product quality information to consumers (signaling role), a mechanism to dis-
criminate consumer risk preferences if customer heterogeneity is not fully observable by the
seller (sorting role), and to incentivize the seller to improve product quality (incentives role).
These theories would thus be consistent with consumer preferences for longer warranties,
all else being equal. Regarding the insurance role (e.g. Heal 1977), warranties provide con-
sumers with some security against poor product quality and are often used by manufacturers
as a value-added feature to promote their products (Thomas 2006). The signaling argument,
on the other hand, predicts that higher quality products will have longer warranties, and is
perhaps the one that has received the most attention. Since Spence’s model of perfect com-
petition in which warranties serve as signals of reliability (Spence 1977), several theoretical
models have qualified this finding in alternative settings (e.g. Cooper and Ross 1985, Gal-Or
1989).
Empirical tests of the signaling role of warranties are also numerous. While early papers
like Wiener (1985) showed a positive association between warranty length and product quality
providing support for the signaling argument, others like Douglas et al. (1993) showed that
the opposite is possible. More recently -and more broadly- Chu and Chintagunta (2011)
empirically tested for the different roles of warranties in the U.S. automobile and PC server
industries, finding support for the insurance and sorting role of warranties, but not for the
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signaling and incentives roles. Given the numerous papers studying the economic role of
warranties, we do not address this question and rather build our model upon some of the
findings in this literature, to study how service attributes such as warranty length and service
quality, along with product quality, jointly influence consumer demand.
Empirical models of demand related to ours that include consumer response to warranties
include Menezes and Currim (1992) and Chu and Chintagunta (2009). Menezes and Currim
(1992) formulate a theoretical model to define the appropriate warranty length for firms,
and they also perform some empirical testing in the automobile industry. Their empirical
analysis is based on a sales response model (aggregate demand function), for which OLS
analysis is performed, and in which several attributes are used to explain total sales for a
given model. They do not deal with the endogeneity of either the price or the warranty
length in the demand specification. In a paper more closely related to our study, Chu and
Chintagunta (2009) empirically analyze the value of warranties in the U.S. server market.
Their research in this B2B setting quantifies the value of warranties for manufacturers,
intermediaries and customers, and finds a positive value for warranties in all cases. As in
our analysis, their demand model is based on a random coefficients logit model that allows
for customer heterogeneity and that is based on market data, but they only account for the
endogeneity of the pricing decision.
While past empirical studies are certainly relevant for our analysis, we establish at least
three important differences. First, these papers focus on warranties exclusively, while our
interest is in services more broadly defined, which includes not only the firm’s warranty
length but also its service quality in the demand specification. Second, our focus is on
understanding the effect on demand of the interaction between service attributes and product
quality. To our knowledge, our findings in this regard have not been established in previous
empirical literature. Third, from a methodological perspective, unlike past papers, note that
we explicitly deal with the endogeneity of both pricing and warranties, and our identification
strategy for warranty effects could be used in other settings2.
With respect to the third aspect, most existing models of product differentiation have
accounted for the endogeneity of prices in the demand specification, under the assumption
of exogeneity of all other product characteristics. This assumption has been recognized
as an important shortcoming in this literature (Berry 1994). As a response, a recent and
growing stream of research on endogenous product choice has considered models in which
some product characteristics other than price are treated as endogenous (see Crawford 2012
for a review of this research stream, or Fan 2013 for a recent example). Our research thus
2See section 4.2 for a discussion of the required assumptions under which our identification strategy is
valid, and sections 5.4 and 6 for discussion of limitations of our strategy.
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also relates to the endogenous product choice literature, as we deal with the endogeneity of
both pricing and the warranty length decision by firms. Finally, our research is related to the
numerous empirical studies in OM that examine the automobile industry, including Fisher
et al. (1999), Ramdas and Randall (2008), Cachon and Olivares (2010), and Gallino et al.
(2013), among many others, that as ours attempt to examine some aspect that contribute to
an understanding of factors influencing the matching between what firms supply and what
consumers demand in this industry.
In short, this paper contributes to the aforementioned streams of research by being one
of the first to empirically analyze the value of service attributes as drivers of demand in
manufacturing industries, and by being (to our knowledge) the first study to empirically
analyze the complementarity and substitution between service attributes and product quality
in the context of demand models in a competitive manufacturing setting. Product quality,
service quality and warranty length are variables of longstanding importance in OM research.
The new empirical evidence of their impact on demand in a competitive setting provided in
this paper, contributes to a better understanding of the strategic implications of the joint
management of these variables by firms.
3. Data and Industry Background
Market-level data was collected from different sources for our analysis. We obtained data on
sales and product characteristics from Ward’s Automotive, for all new light cars sold in the
U.S. in the period 2001-2007. Vehicle specifications include miles-per-gallon, length, width,
height, horsepower and weight, among other features. Data about warranty length were
obtained from the 2009 Official Warranty Guide (J&L Warranty Pros). Data on product
quality and service quality at the brand level were obtained from J.D. Power’s Initial Quality
Study and Costumer Service Index. Aggregate yearly data on transactional prices were
obtained from a secondary source, based on J.D. Power data. Below, we discuss some
characteristics of these data sources in more detail, along with aspects of the industry that
help to clarify our analysis.
Warranty data: Automakers include manufacturer warranties bundled with the pur-
chase of every new car, to protect consumers against defects for a certain period of time/usage.
The most relevant warranties bundled with a new car are the basic warranty (which covers
most parts of a vehicle), and the powertrain warranty (which covers the major cost com-
ponents of the car such as the engine, transmission, etc., usually for an extended period of
time). For example, the Acura 2007 model year vehicles had basic and powertrain warranties
of 4/50,000 and 6/70,000 [years/miles], respectively. For a given brand, there is a high cor-
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relation between the warranty terms for these two types of warranties (indeed, for several
brands the coverage period is often the same for basic and powertrain warranties), and also
between the years/miles metrics.
Most of the existing studies on warranties have focused on the duration of the powertrain
warranty for several reasons. First, the powertrain warranty covers the most expensive parts
of the vehicle. Second, most of the changes in warranty strategies by OEM’s refer to pow-
ertrain warranty duration and therefore is the richer source of longitudinal variation. There
were 25 longitudinal changes for the powertrain warranty during our observation periods,
but only 7 if we look at basic warranties. Examples of changes in powertrain warranties
include Kia from 5/60,000 to 10/100,000 in 2001, Mazda from 3/50,000 to 4/50,000 in 2003,
Mitsubishi from 5/60,000 to 10/100,000 in 2004, Acura from 4/50,000 to 5/70,000 in 2006,
and Chevrolet from 3/36,000 to 5/100,000 in 2007, among several others. Finally, the pow-
ertrain warranty is the warranty that automakers advertise the most. Consistent with these
arguments, we use the length of the powertrain warranty in years as our warranty variable.
Quality data: J.D. Power publishes yearly reports on product quality and service sat-
isfaction at the brand level. Here we provide a brief description of the data used in our
analysis, further details can be obtained via http://www.jdpower.com/.
Our product quality metric is based on J.D. Power’s Initial Quality Study (IQS), which
determines the number of problems per 100 vehicles in the first 90 days of ownership. The
study examines 217 vehicle attributes, and reports on a broad range of problems reported by
owners, including defects/malfunctions (complete breakdown or malfunction of any compo-
nent, feature, or item) and design problems (components or features that may be functioning
as designed, but are perceived to be difficult to use or understand, or are in a poor location).
Every year this information is summarized in a brand-level metric. For example, in 2004 the
best brand was Lexus with 87 problems per 100 vehicles, the worst was Hummer with 173
problems per 100 vehicles, and the industry average was 119 problems per 100 vehicles. We
take the negative of the number of problems per vehicle as our product quality metric PQbt,
such that a higher value for PQbt (smaller number of problems per vehicle) denotes higher
product quality.
Similarly, J.D. Power’s Customer Service Index (CSI) measures the satisfaction of vehicle
owners who visited the dealer service department for maintenance or repair work during the
first three years of ownership. According to the J.D. Power’s description, the CSI study“pro-
vides an overall customer satisfaction index score based on six measures: service initiation,
service advisor, in-dealership experience, service delivery, service quality, and user-friendly
service.” The score is based on a 1000 point scale. For example, in 2004 the best brand was
Lincoln with a score of 912, the worst was Daewoo with a score of 754, and the industry av-
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erage was 862. We note that this metric refers to after-sales service at dealers during the first
three years of ownership, which is coincident with the minimum warranty period observed in
the industry. This metric thus reflects services that occurred during the in-warranty period,
and in conjunction with the warranty length, defines the variables that we use to characterize
the service dimension of a brand. Specifically, our service quality variable SQbt is a scaled
version of the customer service index (CSI score/1000).
We note several interesting observations. Pooling the data for our period of analysis at
the brand level (2001-2007), we obtain a correlation of 0.64 between PQbt and SQbt, denoting
a positive relationship between product quality and service quality. As illustrated in Figure
1, most brands are located on the diagonal of the graph. The graph from 2004 suggests some
exceptions, like Saturn (low product quality, high service quality), and Hyundai and Toyota
(high product quality, low service quality). Similarly, we obtain correlations of -0.13 between
warranty and PQ, and -0.29 between warranty and SQ. These statistics reflect a negative
correlation between warranty length and both product quality and service quality. Note
that the fact that we don’t find a positive correlation between warranty and product quality
provides some descriptive evidence that counters the signaling role of warranties. Figure 1
displays the relationship between our warranty (WARR), product quality (PQ), and service
quality (SQ) metrics for 2004 for the brands in our sample.
Finally, we note that, while the service experience at dealers is not fully determined by
OEM, they can and do influence the service process in several ways. First, OEM impose
guidelines and service standards on their dealers. Second, they can facilitate the quality of
service delivered by dealers through a wide range of managerial interventions, e.g., by setting
up parts pooling mechanisms, sharing information, using vendor-managed inventory and
implementing a generous parts return policy for dealers. Third, OEM usually set up incentive
programs, whereby a dealer’s compensation is, in part, based on service performance. Finally,
the design of the service network, for example, the definition of the number of dealers, is
ultimately defined by the OEM. As an illustration, consider e.g. the evidence discussed
in Cohen et al. (2000), where persistent brand-level differences in after-sales services is
documented e.g. with respect to parts availability for repair services by different brands, as
well as with respect to mechanisms for information sharing and distributed service systems
employed in Saturn’s service supply chain, in contrast to industry standards at the time3.
3Naturally, when it comes to after-sales services, it is clear that in practice some important variation
would occur at the dealer level, not only at a brand level. Dealer-level metrics would potentially provide
richer variation, in contrast to the low level of variation we observe in our brand-level metrics (Table 1).
However, as we argue, there are a number of decisions that are taken at the OEM level, which supports the
perspective we adopt in our study. For further details about dealer/OEM interactions, we refer the reader
to Cohen et al. (2000) for service aspects, and to Cachon and Olivares (2010) for more general aspects.
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Figure 1: Visualization of Warranty, Service Quality and Product Quality (2004)
Sales, prices and product characteristics: We obtained data on sales and product
characteristics from Ward’s Automotive for all new light cars sold in the U.S. between 2001
and 2007. This includes cars belonging to the segments small, middle, large and luxury, as
categorized by Ward’s. Sales data is available at the make-model level (e.g. Toyota Corolla)
monthly. Data on product characteristics is available for each model year and for each of
the versions of a given make-model. Several vehicle-level variables are of interest. First,
the size of the car (SIZE) was measured as the product between the length and the width.
The ratio of horsepower to weight (HPWT) is self-descriptive. We also constructed the
variable miles per dollar (MPD), obtained by dividing the miles-per-gallon by the dollars-
per-gallon in a given year. We obtained monthly average prices for gasoline from the U.S.
Department of Energy (http://www.eia.doe.gov), which are aggregated at the calendar year
level to calculate the MPD variable. Fuel prices are expressed in 2007 dollars using the
CPI index for the respective year, and the same is done for the vehicle price pjt (PRICE),
i.e., all monetary variables in our analysis are expressed in 2007 dollars (data on CPI’s
were obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpirsdc.htm). As noted in existing studies (e.g. Berry et al. 1995,
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
PRICE ($1,000) 34.938 22.161 10.286 170.689
WARR (years) 4.7 1.9 3 10
PQ (-1 x problems per vehicle) -1.289 0.235 -2.670 -0.760
SQ (CSI score/1000) 0.863 0.032 0.781 0.925
MPD ([miles/$]/10) 1.028 0.336 0.439 3.770
HPWT (100 x hp/lb) 0.643 0.171 0.203 1.578
SIZE (sq. inches/10,000) 1.314 0.145 0.792 1.708
Sudhir 2001), a certain level of aggregation is required to match sales data with the respective
product characteristics. For a given product characteristic, e.g. size, we consider the average
size of the options of a given model year as the size associated with that model year (an
approach also taken by Balachander et al. 2009).
In addition, we obtained yearly data on transactional prices at the make-model by model
year level from a secondary source based on J.D. Power data. These data are collected at
the daily level by J.D. Power from a sample of dealers in the U.S. covering about 70% of the
geographical areas and 15-20% of total U.S. sales. These data reflect transactional prices paid
by consumers after rebates and as such, are more informative of actual consumer expenses
than the manufacturer suggested retail price which is usually used in research papers due to
the unavailability of information about transactional prices. We only have access to these
data at the aggregate yearly level, more precisely, the average across time of the transactional
prices paid by consumers for a given make-model by model year in the period September-
August of each year, which is the definition used for calendar year in our analysis. Note that
sales data from Ward’s do not distinguish between different model years of a given make-
model sold in the same calendar year. In practice, however, in a given calendar year different
model years of the same make-model are sold simultaneously. The pricing data set contains
sales at the model year level for each calendar year for the sample of dealers described above.
We use the distribution of sales in this data set and apply it to the market level sales data
from Ward’s to obtain sales at the make-model by model year level. A similar approach to
matching both data sets was taken by Copeland et al. (2011).
Sample: We match all data sources as described above. Our final sample consists of 2122
yearly observations for all new light cars sold in the U.S. in calendar years 2001-2007, which
includes model years from 2000 to 2008. Our unit of analysis is a make-model by model
year and calendar year, e.g. 2005 Toyota Corolla in calendar year 2005. Table 1 displays
descriptive statistics for the relevant variables in our sample of 2122 observations, including
statistics for the warranty length (WARR), product quality (PQ), and service quality (SQ).
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix
Variable PRICE WARR PQ SQ MPD HPWT SIZE
WARR -0.19***
PQ 0.29*** -0.10***
SQ 0.26*** -0.24*** 0.66***
MPD -0.39*** 0.02 -0.18*** -0.41***
HPWT 0.76*** -0.18*** 0.24*** 0.30*** -0.56***
SIZE 0.28*** -0.22*** 0.21*** 0.32*** -0.44*** 0.24***
Note: *, **, ***, Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, confidence levels, respectively.
Table 2 displays the correlation matrix for these variables.
4. Model
4.1 Demand model formulation
We consider a random coefficients logit demand model, where the utility that consumer i
derives from purchasing vehicle model j (j = 1, ..., J) of brand b (b = 1, ..., B) in calendar year
t (t = 1, ..., T ) depends on the vehicle price pjt, a vector of observable vehicle characteristics
(size, horsepower to weight ratio, etc.) xjt, warranty duration wbt, product quality PQbt,
service quality SQbt, other brand-level variables xbt, as follows:
uijt = αipjt + x
′
jtβi + h(wbt, PQbt, SQbt)γ + x
′
btη + ξjt + ijt (1)
The term ξjt represents unobserved product attributes common to all consumers, and
ijt is a type I extreme value idiosyncratic shock. Consumers maximize utility, and purchase
vehicle j in calendar year t if and only if uijt≥ uirt for all r = 0, 1, ..., J . Here, r = 0
defines the outside good, i.e., the option of not purchasing a new light car in year t, where
ui0t= i0t. The individual-level coefficients αi and βi are decomposed into a mean effect
common to all consumers (β′s) and individual deviations from that mean (σ′s). The total
effect of attribute xkjt on the utility of consumer i is thus modeled as (βk+σkυik)x
k
jt, where βk
and σk are parameters to be estimated, and υik is an individual-level shock obtained from a
standard normal distribution; the same holds for αi. It is useful to note that uijt can be thus
expressed more compactly as a function of the mean utility δjt common across all consumers,
and the heterogeneity terms µijt and ijt as:
uijt = δjt(pjt, xjt, wbt, PQbt, SQbt, xbt; θ1) + µijt(pjt, xjt, υi; θ2) + ijt (2)
Here, θ1 is a vector containing all parameters of the mean utility (α, β, and γ), and
θ2 contains the heterogeneity parameters (σ). Let djt contain all M vehicle characteristics
12
involved in the heterogeneity estimates. Thus δjt and µijt are defined as:
δjt = αpjt + x
′
jtβ + h(wbt, PQbt, SQbt)γ + x
′







The function h(wjt, PQjt, SQjt) defines the way in which warranty length, product quality
and service quality enter into the utility function. Under the linearity assumption for these
variables, the utility function takes the following form:
uijt = αipjt + x
′
jtβi + γ1wbt + γ2PQbt + γ3SQbt + x
′
btη + ξjt + ijt (5)
This formulation is useful to capture the main effects of the variables of interest, and is
also consistent with the linearity assumption made for the rest of the covariates. We refer
to the model derived from the utility function in Eq. 5 as the main effects model.
We are also interested in testing, however, whether service attributes and product qual-
ity act as complements, substitutes or independently in the demand function. For this
purpose, we consider an enhanced formulation in which the function h(wbt, PQbt, SQbt) not
only includes the main effects for these three variables -as described in Eq. 5- but also
their interaction terms wbt ∗ PQbt, wbt ∗ SQbt, and PQbt ∗ SQbt. These interactions reflect
the non-linearities of interest, i.e., the complementarity/substitution effects between service
attributes and product quality.
At this regard, a recent study by Guajardo and Cohen (2015) has shown that service
quality and product quality perceptions act as complements in terms of how they determine
the likelihood to recommend the brand in an application in the consumer electronics industry.
In their study, they focus on brand loyalty by customers and they find that the better
the perceptions of product quality of a person, the higher the impact of better perception
about service quality on the person’s likelihood to recommend the brand. Their results
are based on a sample of existing customers of one major brand, in contrast to this paper
in which we focus on the whole market and cover all brands under competition. In the
context of our demand model, we would expect service attributes and product quality also
to be complements if the dominating mechanism by which they affect consumer demand is
through their impact on brand image. A related argument can be proposed in support of the
complementarity hypothesis. If higher product quality creates higher utility and enjoyment
for drivers, receiving good service (e.g., cars repaired more quickly and smoothly) could be
more valuable for cars with higher product quality (if they serve the basic need of transport
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with value added in terms of driving experience), relative to a lower quality car (if it only
satisfies the basic need of transport).
On the other hand, service attributes could act as substitutes for product quality if the
main mechanism by which they affect consumer demand is by compensating consumers for
poor product quality, i.e., if the car purchase process can be described as a compensatory
process with respect to these attributes. In a compensatory decision process (e.g., Dieckmann
et al. 2009), strengths along one or more dimensions of product or service quality can
compensate for weaknesses along others. This is in contrast to the case of non-compensatory
processes, in which no compensation is possible if certain attributes of a product or service
are weak, even if it possesses strengths along other dimensions. The role of compensatory
effects in consumer decision-making would thus provide a basis for characterizing our service
attributes as substitutes for product quality.
Similar arguments can be hypothesized for the interaction between warranty and service
quality, i.e., a negative interaction under the hypothesis of compensatory attributes, or a
complementary (positive) relationship not only if they both contribute to better brand image,
but also if the main mechanism by which they affect consumer demand is by providing
complementary functionality (longer and better service support). In the case of warranties
and product quality, their insurance role (Heal 1977, Emons 1989) implies that warranties
should be more important for consumers when the product is expected to fail more often, i.e.,
when product quality is lower, which would provide additional support for the hypothesis of
a negative coefficient for the term wbt ∗ PQbt.
Alternatively, all three attributes may exhibit independent effects on consumer decision-
making, in which case no significance would be obtained for the interaction terms. In this
scenario of competing theories, whether service attributes act as complements, substitutes, or
independent of product quality in the demand function is ultimately an empirical question,
which we attempt to answer in this study.
4.2 Identification and instruments
In practice, most of the observed variables in our demand specification are determined or
influenced by firm’s decisions. On the other hand, ξjt reflects characteristics or shocks not
observed in the data, such as style, prestige, and reputation, that affect the demand for dif-
ferent products. An endogeneity problem for the demand parameters emerges if some of the
observed variables are set by firms upon observing the demand shocks ξjt. As noted, most
existing studies have accounted for the endogeneity of prices in the demand specification
under the assumption of exogeneity for all other product characteristics. More precisely, the
mean independence condition E[ξ|x] = 0 is assumed for all exogenous x. While the exogene-
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ity assumption for non-price characteristics has been widely acknowledged as a shortcoming
since Berry (1994), the underlying argument for it relies on the fact that, while the prices
are easily adjustable by firms according to the market conditions and therefore pjt is likely
to be correlated with ξjt (i.e., price endogeneity), other product characteristics captured by
xjt (e.g., horsepower, size) are defined by firms well in advance of the time when a model is
sold in the market, and thus are assumed to be uncorrelated with ξjt.
To account for the endogeneity of prices, instrumental variables can be used in the esti-
mation. A well-known example is Berry et al. (1995)’s model for the auto industry involving
prices pjt and product characteristics xjt in the demand specification. Their supply model
considers firms competing on prices, and makes a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium assumption.
Under these assumptions, they propose a set of instruments to deal with price endogeneity:
the sum (or average) of product characteristics xjt for (i) other cars of the same firm, and (ii)
cars of other firms. Product characteristics xjt are exogenous by assumption, and are thus
also used as instruments. This set of instruments has been widely used to deal with price
endogeneity since then (e.g., Sudhir et al. 2001, Train and Winston 2007, Balachander et al.
2009). We use this set of instruments to deal with price endogeneity; as in Sudhir (2001),
instead of considering the average characteristics for cars of all other firms, we compute the
average characteristics of other firms’ cars in the same market segment (small, middle, large,
luxury), which refines the set of instruments by using cars that are closer to each other in
terms of characteristics.
Our specification of the demand model involves not only prices and vehicle characteristics,
but also brand level attributes wbt, PQbt, and SQbt. In principle, firms can easily set the
length of the warranty wbt in response to the unobserved factors in ξjt. A similar observation
was made by Menezes and Currim (1992), who noted that in contrast to changes in product
quality, changes in warranty length and price could be carried out almost instantaneously 4.
Thus, warranties are expected to be endogenous in the demand specification.
Conversely, let us consider firm actions to influence PQbt and SQbt. Note that firms can
affect product quality by introducing changes in product design, using better parts/components
(Ramdas and Randall 2008), redesigning their processes, etc. All of these factors will be re-
flected over a term longer than our yearly period of analysis. The time-to-market of a vehicle,
for example, can take several years from the beginning of the design stage to product launch.
Similarly, factors influencing service quality such as the implementation of optimization-
based technologies for the management of parts inventories, the design of a more efficient
4Of course, consistent with the observed data, in practice there are reasons that could prevent firms from
adjusting warranties too frequently. For example, firms wanting to decrease warranty length as a response
to a negative warranty cost shock may opt for not doing so due to potential detrimental impact on brand
image.
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service network, and a higher focus on services more generally, will usually involve long-term
efforts and cultural changes by firms (see, e.g., Cohen et al. 2000). We thus assume that the
observed PQbt and SQbt are not easily adjustable contemporaneously by firms upon observ-
ing the shocks ξjt, and therefore will consider PQbt and SQbt to be exogenous in the demand
specification. This is our main identification assumption.
We assume therefore that firms compete on prices and warranties. This assumption is
consistent with some prior theoretical models (e.g., Spence 1977, Gal-Or 1989), which have
modeled competition based on these two variables, taking other factors such as product
quality as given. As noted, by offering warranties, firms incur important warranty costs
wcjt. In order to illustrate our instruments, it is useful to expand on the drivers of the
warranty costs for firms.
Generically, let N(t) be the stochastic process for the number of failures of a vehicle by
time t, and Yn(t) the cost of failure n at time t, independent of N(t). A standard formulation
for expected warranty costs (e.g., Thomas 2006 pp. 67) if the warranty length is set to W
is thus wc(W ) = E[
∑
n=1,...,N(W ) Yn(t)]. If the time between failures is iid, the expected
warranty costs are given by wc(W ) = E[N(W )]E[Yn(t)]. The term E[N(W )] represents
the expected number of failures during the warranty period, which depends on the warranty
length and the failure process. For example, if N(t) is assumed to be a homogeneous Poisson
process and λ is the failure rate per time unit, then E[N(W )]=λW ; if the failure process
is more complex, in general N(t) will not necessarily have a tractable closed-form solution.
For our purposes (and using our notation), however, it suffices to note that E[N(W )] is a
function of product quality PQjt and the warranty length wjt. With respect to the expected
cost per event, E[Yn(t)] , we must consider heterogeneity across brands. In particular, and
in line with the previous literature (e.g. Cohen and Whang 1997), providing a certain level
of service quality is costly, and thus the cost per event will depend on the quality of service
provided when servicing the vehicle, for which our SQjt variable can serve as a proxy. Let
xbjt denote other observable characteristics that capture part of the brand heterogeneity in
warranty costs, and ςjt unobservable factors. The warranty costs function g can be thus
represented conceptually as:
wcjt = g(wbt, PQbt, SQbt, xbt, xjt, ςjt) (6)
We derive instruments for the warranty length based on the exogeneity assumption for
PQbt, SQbt, and for product characteristics other than price and warranty more generally,
and our supply side assumption (with competition on prices and warranties only), as follows.
Consider vehicles i and j, produced by brands q and r respectively (q 6= r). Note that given
our assumption that firms compete on prices and warranties, wqt and wrt are the result of
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Figure 2: Instruments
the strategic interaction of firms and are therefore correlated. If firms set their warranties
optimally (or at least, take into account the expected warranty costs), wqt will be correlated
with the drivers of warranty costs, e.g., PQqt (see Eq. 6). Similarly, wrt will be correlated
with PQrt. Noting that uijt depends only on vehicle i
′s attributes, then PQrt (attribute of
vehicle j) is a valid (source of) instruments for wqt (attribute of vehicle i). We thus consider
the average of product quality of other brands as an instrument for the warranty of a given
brand.
We apply this same argument to generate instruments using the rest of the drivers of
warranty costs, i.e., SQbt and xbt (Eq. 6). In xbt we include dummies for the region of the
manufacturer (coded into three categories: USA, Europe, Asia) to partially capture het-
erogeneity across brands. Thus, our set of instruments for warranties includes the average
product quality of other brands, the average service quality of other brands, and the pro-
portion of brands belonging to the different geographical regions. To further explain the
logic behind these instruments, warranty definitions by a brand should consider the brand’s
product quality and service quality. Since in our model the warranty length is the result of
strategic interaction among firms, product quality and service quality of competing brands
thus indirectly influence the warranty choice for a brand. This mechanism justifies the rele-
vance of our proposed IV’s of average product quality and average service quality by other
brands.
Exogeneity of these IV’s follows from the assumption of the exogeneity of product quality
and service quality and from the fact that the utility obtained from a given product does
not depend on other products’ characteristics (recall that we require the mean independence
assumption E[ξ|x] = 0 for all exogenous variables x). Note that heterogeneity at the vehicle
model level is already captured through the xjt-based instruments. Finally, since 2003 it
has been mandatory for firms traded in the U.S. to disclose warranty costs in their financial
statements, which was private information before that. This modifies the information set
under which firms make their warranty decisions and, being unrelated to the demand side,
may thus serve as additional source of exogenous variation to instrument for warranties. We
thus construct an indicator function (pre vs. post 2004 calendar year) and include it as an
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additional instrument.
Finally, note that we observe cross-sectional and longitudinal price variation for all models
and years, as well as for product quality and service quality for all brands and years. Although
the variation in warranties is more limited (e.g., it does not allow us to include brand fixed
effects in the demand specification), we do observe cross-sectional variation across brands
in our warranty variable each year and longitudinal variation for several brands at some
point in our observation period. For some of these brands with longitudinal changes we
also observe variation in warranty length for different model years of the same make-model
being sold in the same calendar year. Finally, there is variation in the observed warranties
in the market (as well as in the rest of the variables) due to changes in the choice set of
vehicles available in the market each year. Also note that, along with the warranty length,
we include other brand-level variables in the demand specification (product quality, service
quality, and manufacturer geographical region), which partially alleviates concerns about
brand fixed effects as potential confounders5.
4.3 Estimation
The estimation of random coefficients demand models is discussed in detail in Berry (1994),
Berry et al. (1995), and elsewhere. Here we only review briefly some key aspects.
Under the Type I extreme value distribution assumption for ijt, the market share for









exp(δjt + µijt(υi, ..., ; θ2))
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp(δkt + µikt(υi, ...; θ2))
P (υ)dυ, (7)
where P (υ) is the joint distribution over all elements of υi, i.e., the product of standard
normals. The integral in Eq.(7) does not have a closed form, and is evaluated using simula-
tion, drawing values from the distribution of υ for a sample of individuals. The estimation of
the model proceeds as follows. For a given draw of θ2, actual
6 and predicted (Eq.7) market
shares are equated by means of a contraction mapping that allows us to obtain a unique
solution for δjt, which is in turn used to compute the value of ξjt, or more precisely, ξjt(θ)
(inner loop). Let Z denote the available instruments. The sample analogs to the moment
5Note, however, that omitted brand effects may still be playing an important role. Not being able to fully
account for this aspect is a limitation of our data. We provide a number of robustness checks along with an
in-depth discussion of the role brand in section 5.4.
6Market shares are obtained by dividing actual sales by the market size. As in most previous studies, we
define the market size as being the number of households in the U.S. for a given year. Data on the number
of households was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau (available at http://www.census.gov).
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conditions E[ξZ] = 0 can thus be constructed by using ξ(θ). An outer loop searching for
the parameters θˆ that solve the minimization of the GMM objective function completes the
estimation routine (i.e., θˆ = arg θmin ξ(θ)
′ZΦ−1Z ′ξ(θ)). Here, the weighting matrix Φ is a
consistent estimate of E[Z ′ξ(θ)ξ(θ)′Z], and is obtained employing the usual two-stage proce-
dure (see Nevo 2000 for more details). Finally, as noted by Knittel and Metaxoglou (2014),
the estimation procedure is subject to variability depending on the optimization algorithms
and initial values considered. Similarly, Dube et al. (2012) note the dangers of using loose
tolerance levels in the estimation procedure. Consistent with best practices recommended
in both cases, we use multiple optimization algorithms, 50 different starting values, and
best-practice tolerance levels in our implementation7.
5. Empirical analysis
5.1 Main effects model
Our specification for xjt builds upon existing literature, using variables similar to those used
by Berry et al. (1995), Sudhir (2001) and Balachander et al. (2009). We include the variables
SIZE, HPWT, and MPD as product characteristics in xjt. We also include in xjt dummy
variables to indicate whether a model year is from the previous year (PREVY MY) or the
next year (NEXTY MY), dummy variables to indicate whether the model was launched
in the last 2 years (INTRO2Y) or is soon (2 years) to be out of the market (EXIT2Y),
and a time trend (TREND). In terms of the additional brand-level variables xbt, we include
dummy variables for manufacturer region (MANUF EUR, MANUF ASIA; MANUF USA is
the excluded category).
We start our discussion of the results with the estimation of the main effects model (Eq.
5). The random coefficients model -which allows for customer heterogeneity and accounts for
the endogeneity of prices and warranties- is obtained by performing the estimation procedure
described in section (4.3).8 If customer heterogeneity is ignored (i.e. µijt = 0), the model
(Eq. 3) can be estimated by OLS regression (if the endogeneity of prices and warranties is
not accounted for) or by using instrumental variable techniques (e.g. 2SLS). We refer to the
latter case as IV LOGIT. Table 3 displays the results obtained in each of the aforementioned
cases.
The results in Table 3 show that the coefficient for the price moves in the expected
7We use five optimization methods: two quasi-newton methods, nelder-mead simplex, solvopt and conju-
gate gradient. Also, we use tolerance levels of e−14 for the inner loop and e−6 for the outer loop.
8In our implementation, we include random coefficients for variables for which we observe most substantial
variation at the make-model level, i.e. PRICE, HPWT, SIZE and MPD.
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direction, i.e., demand becomes most sensitive to price as the price endogeneity is accounted
for. Indeed, sensitivity to price more than doubles, similar to the findings in Berry et al.
(1995) and Petrin (2002). Similarly, the coefficient of the warranty variable has a negative
sign in the OLS regression (-0.034). However, once the endogeneity of the warranty length is
accounted for using the instrumental variables described in the discussion of our identification
strategy (IV LOGIT and Random coefficients model), we obtained a positive and significant
effect of warranty length on demand9. Note that the fact that a positive coefficient for
warranty (0.082 in the random coefficients model, 0.132 in the IV LOGIT) is only obtained
after correcting for the endogeneity of the warranty variable and that a negative coefficient
is obtained otherwise, is consistent with a scenario in which brand reputation (which is
part of the unobservable) is negatively correlated with the warranty length, which in turn
explains the bias in the warranty coefficient if we do not employ our strategy for endogeneity
correction. Other variables with a significant effect on demand are PQ, HPWT, SIZE, and
dummy control variables for vehicle model year, manufacturer region (significant effect for
European automakers only), model exit, and the time trend. The results displayed for the
random coefficients model also include the magnitude of the estimates for the heterogeneity
parameters, which indeed reveals significant heterogeneity effects for price, the horsepower
to weight ratio, and the vehicle size.
9We also estimated the model accounting only for the endogeneity of price, ignoring the endogeneity of
warranty length (not reported in the text). We obtained a negative coefficient of warranty length in that
case.
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Table 3: Estimation of the main effects model
RANDOM COEFFICIENTS MODEL
Variable
OLS IV LOGIT Main effects Heterogeneity
Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err Estimate Std.Err.
PRICE -0.035*** 0.003 -0.083*** 0.010 -0.096*** 0.010 0.028*** 0.006
WARR -0.034* 0.018 0.132*** 0.049 0.082* 0.048
PQ 0.670*** 0.168 0.755*** 0.186 0.950*** 0.183
SQ -7.038*** 1.449 1.193 2.257 0.069 2.126
HPWT 0.059 0.298 4.369*** 0.905 2.319** 0.941 0.729*** 0.249
SIZE 1.625*** 0.257 3.245*** 0.422 2.497*** 0.440 0.436*** 0.118
MPD -0.169 0.138 0.302* 0.180 -0.110 0.227 0.131 0.194
NEXTY MY -2.64*** 0.075 -2.652*** 0.083 -2.654*** 0.089
PREVY MY -1.885*** 0.063 -1.928*** 0.071 -1.916*** 0.060
INTRO2Y 0.089 0.090 0.115 0.100 0.103 0.094
EXIT2Y -0.891*** 0.123 -0.943*** 0.136 -1.015*** 0.132
TREND -0.042** 0.019 -0.152*** 0.030 -0.265*** 0.037
MANUF EUR 0.057 0.106 1.209*** 0.260 0.907*** 0.252
MANUF ASIA -0.101 0.077 -0.049 0.110 -0.034 0.103
CONSTANT -1.844 1.533 -13.135*** 2.765 -8.626*** 2.839
Note: *, **, ***, Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, confidence levels, respectively.
With respect to the estimation of the random coefficients model, as noted in section 4.3,
we use different optimization algorithms and starting values. The reported solution in Table
3 is the one for which the value of the GMM objective function is minimized (equal to 169.1
in this case), and satisfies both first and second order conditions of optimality (i.e. zero
gradient and positive-definite Hessian)10. Most important, the results of the main effects
model illustrate the effect of the instruments used in estimation, which act to adjust the
price and warranty coefficients in the expected direction. In the first stage of the 2SLS
procedure, the test for excluded instruments leads to rejection of the null hypotheses of
excluded instruments having no explanatory power both in the case of PRICE and WARR (p-
value<0.0001 in both cases), with R2 and F statistic of 0.78 and 222.7 in the case of PRICE,
and 0.44 and 50.5 in the case of WARR, respectively. The underidentification test also leads
to rejecting the null of underidentification (p-value<0.0001, Anderson LM statistic=146.7).
Overall, the model has desirable statistical properties and the tests performed support the
use of our instruments.
10The estimation procedure arrives at the same optimal solution in 52% of the runs, which is in the order of
magnitude of recent reports, e.g. Knittel and Metaxoglou (2014) and Dube et al. (2012), and is aligned with
their findings about the need to use multiple starting values, optimization algorithms, and tight tolerance
levels.
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5.2 Model with complementarities
The model in the previous section is useful to study the main effects of our variables of
interest and to illustrate the way in which our instrumentation strategy works. As noted
earlier, however, we are also interested in investigating complementarities/substitution effects
between service attributes and product quality. We now turn to the discussion of the results
of the model involving two-way interactions between warranty length, service quality and
product quality. We “mean center” the variables involved in interaction terms (WARR,
PQ and SQ), i.e. we subtract the mean from each individual observation, such that the
individual coefficients for the single terms of these variables reflect the effect when the other
two variables are set to their average values. The results of the random coefficients model
are displayed in Table 4.
The GMM function in the optimal solution is 128.6 in this case, the solution satisfies
both first and second order conditions for optimality, and the estimation procedure led to
the reported optimal solution in 52% of the runs. Similarly to the main effects case, the
model and the instruments have desirable statistical properties. In the first stage of the
2SLS procedure, the test for excluded instruments leads to rejection of the null hypotheses
of excluded instruments having no explanatory power in all cases of PRICE, WARR, WAR-
RxPQ, WARRxSQ (p-value<0.0001 in all cases), with R2 and F statistic of 0.78 and 217.8
in the case of PRICE, 0.45 and 50.1 for WARR, 0.27 and 22.6 for WARRxPQ, and 0.21 and
16.7 for WARRxSQ, respectively. The underidentification test leads to rejecting the null of
underidentification (p-value<0.0001, Anderson LM statistic=113.9).
The negative and significant coefficient for the interaction term WARRxPQ indicates
that the marginal effect of an additional year of warranty coverage on demand decreases
with product quality, or, conversely, is higher when product quality is lower. A longer war-
ranty acts as a partial substitute for product quality, which is consistent with the insurance
role of warranties. Similarly, we obtain a negative and significant coefficient for the term
PQxSQ. Noting that the effect of service quality is not significant when treated in isolation
in the main effects model (Table 3), this result suggests that service quality is of value for
consumers mainly when the product quality is low. Jointly, these results provide support
for the compensatory role of service attributes with respect to product quality, ruling out
potential complementarities between product and service attributes in the demand function.
In contrast, we obtain a positive and significant coefficient for the term WARRxSQ, indicat-
ing that the marginal effect on demand of an additional year of warranty coverage increases
with service quality, i.e. there is a complementary relationship between the length of the
warranty and service quality.
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Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err.




WARR x PQ -1.217*** 0.331
WARR x SQ 7.465*** 2.871
PQ x SQ -29.236*** 6.943
HPWT 1.021 1.071 1.119*** 0.291
SIZE 2.204*** 0.527 0.353*** 0.106
MPD -0.562* 0.330 0.318 0.233
NEXTY MY -2.728*** 0.093




MANUF EUR 0.708** 0.310
MANUF ASIA -0.048 0.107
CONSTANT -7.281*** 1.314
Note: *, **, ***, Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, confidence levels, respectively.
5.3 Discussion
Our results indicate that warranties have a significant effect on consumer demand, and that
the marginal value of an additional year of warranty decreases with product quality and
increases with service quality. Our estimates reveal that the median implied willingness to
pay for an additional year of warranty, obtained as the ratio of the marginal utility of warranty
length to the marginal disutility of price, is approximately $850 which is equivalent to about
3.1% of the median vehicle price in our sample. This estimate seems reasonable by industry
standards. Indeed, a comparable number was quoted in a recent industry report which
mentioned that “consumers pay about 2 percent of the vehicle price per year of extended
service” (Consumer Reports 2008).
Also, if we focus on the mean consumer utility, we note that, for a car with median
product characteristics in our sample, the effect on consumer utility of a 1% price decrease
is equivalent, all else being equal, to increasing product quality by 2.2%, and is in turn
equivalent to increasing the warranty length by 8%. These benchmarks are useful for under-
standing the relative impact of different managerial interventions with respect to consumer
demand. Indeed, these demand estimates can inform managerial decision-making by al-
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lowing managers to anticipate the effect of alternative interventions on consumer demand,
which together with their usually good knowledge about the costs involved for each of these
interventions, could be used to quantify trade-offs involved in managerial decision-making
regarding these variables.
Further analysis of our model also reveals that median elasticities across manufacturers
are -2.3 and 0.6 for price and warranty respectively (for product quality and service quality
medians are 2.2 and 0.5, respectively). Moreover, our estimates indicate that warranties
play a more important role for U.S. manufacturers than for foreign firms during our period
of analysis. Indeed, median implied warranty elasticity is about 50% higher for U.S. than for
non-U.S. manufacturers, and similarly willingness to pay for warranties is larger for American
brands. Our analysis provides an explanation for the higher relevance of warranties for
American cars, i.e., that U.S.-based manufacturers had on average lower product quality
and higher service quality than their foreign counterparts in that period. According to the
results of our model, both of these factors imply a higher marginal effect of warranty length
on consumer demand.
To summarize, warranties act as substitute for product quality, and as complement to
service quality. As an illustration, if we split our sample into high (upper 50%) and low
(bottom 50%) product quality and service quality, we observe that the highest demand
response to warranty is obtained in the low product quality/high service quality region,
where demand is actually elastic with respect to warranties, while the impact is lower when
product quality is high and service quality is low. Indeed, warranty elasticity is approximately
ten times higher in the low product quality region than in the high product quality region,
and approximately twice as large in the high service quality region than in the low service
quality region.
As further illustration of the implications of these results, let us consider, for example,
the case of Kia, a brand that was characterized as having both low product quality and low
service quality during our period of analysis. Having low product quality, and consistent
with our result of warranties acting as substitutes for product quality, Kia increased the
length of their powertrain warranty from 5 years/60,000 miles to 10 years/100,000 miles
in 2001, i.e., the brand offered “America’s No. 1 warranty”. Our results imply that Kia
would have benefited the most out of this great warranty coverage (in terms of the effect of
this policy on consumer demand), if it had contemporaneously invested in providing better
service quality, along with the warranty length increase. In short, being good at one service
dimension (service quality) amplifies the effect of being good at another service dimension




We now discuss some of the relevant modeling choices and examine the robustness of our
main findings with respect to variations in some model constructs. Tables 5 and 6 display the
results obtained for some selected robustness checks discussed in this section, several others
are discussed but not displayed due to space limitations. For ease of display, we only show
results for the mean utility estimates and for a subset of covariates; all models referenced in
this section refer to the ones in tables 5 and 6 unless otherwise noted.
First, in section 3, we discussed a number of reasons why we use the length of the
powertrain warranty in years as our warranty variable. Using alternative definitions, we
found our main findings to be robust if, for example, we consider miles instead of years
(model 1), or if we consider a weighted average between powertrain and basic warranty as
our warranty variable (model 2; the interaction WARRxSQ becomes insignificant with a
p-value 0.13); the basic warranty has very low variation and partially dampens significance.
Another relevant issue is the definition of the product quality variable. Arguably, there
is no perfect way to measure quality. We believe, however, that the metric of problems
per vehicle based on the initial quality study by J.D. Power is a reasonable choice. Indeed
this definition captures a relatively objective metric of product quality, that has been widely
available in the past, and that has had lots of visibility for consumers historically. J.D. Power
also publishes data on vehicle dependability, which measures quality problems after 3 years of
ownership. We collected some of these data and found a high correlation (0.75) between the
vehicle dependability metric and our initial quality variable, which suggest some consistency
in both product quality metrics. Furthermore, we think that quality problems in the first
three months of ownership may be much more disruptive than quality problems after three
years, which is one reason to prefer the initial quality variable used in our study (in addition,
considering initial quality instead of vehicle dependability allows us to perform the analysis
with a larger sample size). Nevertheless, we estimated the model using the vehicle’s 3-year
dependability metric to construct the product quality variable (model 3), and found results
that are largely consistent with our main results, with the exception of the significance of
the coefficient for the WARRxSQ variable with a p-value of 0.11.
As an additional test at this regard, we collected data from Consumer Reports that
measures product quality (reliability ratings in a relative five-point scale) at the model level,
as opposed to the brand-level product quality variable from JD Power. We report results for
this test in model 4, which also considers the quality variables lagged by one period11. As
11We use contemporaneous quality metrics in our main models. One reasonable alternative could be
to use lagged variables if consumers consider looking at that information in their decision making process
(something perhaps more likely in the case of Consumer Reports scores). The idea behind our choice of
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Table 5: Selected various Robustness checks - Estimates of mean utility coeffi-
cients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err.
PRICE -0.101*** 0.012 -0.099*** 0.012 -0.084*** 0.011 -0.113*** 0.024
WARR 0.125* 0.066 0.119 0.112 0.135* 0.080 0.083 0.082
PQ 1.805*** 0.369 1.363*** 0.300 0.477*** 0.146 0.038 0.062
SQ -4.416 3.048 -3.331 2.889 -0.507 3.120 0.210 0.292
WARR x PQ -1.856*** 0.415 -1.207*** 0.408 -0.572*** 0.171 -0.311*** 0.105
WARR x SQ 9.788*** 2.368 5.978 3.901 6.467 4.098 1.030*** 0.316
PQ x SQ -35.018*** 8.100 -23.785*** 6.261 -20.725*** 4.203 -0.081 0.136
Notes: (1): Powertrain warranty in (10,000’s) miles instead of years; (2): combined powertrain/basic war-
ranty variable; (3): PQ in demand specification measured using the problems per vehicle metric of J.D.
Power’s dependability study; (4) PQ measured by the model-level reliability rating from Consumer reports,
quality metrics lagged by one period. *, **, ***, Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, confidence levels, respec-
tively.
can be seen, directionally we obtain results somewhat similar to our main models, with the
exception of the interaction between product and service quality becoming non-significant.
There is an important caveat regarding the models that use Consumer Report data though,
which is that these data is only available for 60% of our sample (equivalent to 78% in terms of
sales), which could introduce some undesirable selection bias in those estimates, in particular
dismissing some of the variation in our data necessary for identification (even at a brand level,
the limited sample dismisses almost 20% of the brand-years). In addition, Consumer Reports
data is a relative measure of product quality on a 1-5 scale, in contrast to the JD Power
metric which measures product quality in an absolute scale, a factor also influencing these
results.
Another concern with the model specification is that the results could be driven by ex-
treme data points. In particular, Saturn can be seen as the only clear example of a brand
consistently having good service quality and low product quality. We run our models ex-
cluding observations from Saturn, obtaining similar results to our main specification (not
reported). Similarly, one could postulate a three-way interaction effect among product qual-
ity, service quality and warranty, meaning that the two-way interaction effects postulated
by our model could in turn be moderated by the remaining variable as a third factor. We
extended our model specification by adding the three-way interaction term WARRxPQxSQ
and our main findings remain robust to this variation (not reported).
contemporaneous metrics is that the quality metrics reflect the actual quality experienced by consumers and
that this information is a good summary of the quality information for consumers in a given year. We do
not postulate that consumers would look exactly at that information before making a purchase, but rather
than in general terms they reflect reasonably well reality for consumers in a given period.
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Next, based on the exogeneity assumption for product quality and service quality, our
identification strategy makes use of competitor’s product quality and service quality as in-
struments, among several other instruments. We have argued extensively why in our static
model of price and warranty competition these instruments are well justified. However, as
a way to partially relax the impact of that assumption, we tested a model that does not
include competitor’s product quality and service quality as additional instruments obtaining
very similar results (not reported), in particular, all our key coefficients remain significant.
Perhaps a more sensitive issue is the potential role of brand fixed effects as confounders.
As noted in section 4.2, the level of variation in our warranty variable does not allow us to
control for brand fixed effects in the usual way in the model specification. This is certainly
a limitation of our data and a matter of concern in our analysis and in our identification
strategy. We noted, however, that the warranty is not the only brand-level variable in our
model, and indeed, we are including product quality, service quality and an indicator of the
manufacturer region as brand level variables. We make the following two observations in
this regard. First, note that omitted brand-level factors are part of the unobservable, and
accordingly this is part of the reason behind our identification strategy for warranties, i.e., in
our formulation we are implicitly accounting for them in the estimation of warranty effects.
Second, we collected some additional brand-level variables, like the number of dealers
of each brand (obtained from Automotive News’s market data books) and the brand age,
and estimated our models including these variables in the model specification as a way to
partially control for some brand effects not captured in the main formulation. Our main
findings remained only partially robust to these variations (models 5-6). In particular, the
complementarity and substitution patterns remain qualitatively mostly robust (with the
exception of the interaction WARR*SQ in model 6), although some effects are quantitatively
less strong in terms of effect size than in our main model. We also tested some logit models
with instrumental variables including also brand-level random effects, and the results were
largely robust to this variation, with the exception of the non-significance of the interaction
between warranty and service quality (not reported).
Finally, as a perhaps more definitive test of the brand issue, and considering the impos-
sibility of including brand fixed effects and our brand-level variables at the same time for all
brands, we adopted a modified approach that partially addresses this issue. The approach is
to include brand fixed effects (dummies) but only for brands for which we observe longitudi-
nal variation in warranties (i.e., brands with at least one warranty change in the observation
period). We tested two versions of this approach, i.e., including brand fixed effects for the
subset of brands with longitudinal variation in warranties that were in the top 10 brands
with most sales (model 7), and including brand fixed effects for all brands with longitudi-
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Table 6: Selected Brand-Robustness checks - Estimates of mean utility coefficients
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err.
PRICE -0.077*** 0.013 -0.077*** 0.014 -0.091*** 0.012 -0.094*** 0.013
WARR 0.116 0.073 0.073 0.074 0.155** 0.078 0.219** 0.093
PQ 0.971*** 0.327 1.009*** 0.295 0.862*** 0.281 1.054*** 0.355
SQ -0.585 2.811 -1.478 2.854 1.297 2.527 0.095 2.424
WARR x PQ -0.956*** 0.308 -0.909*** 0.284 -0.742** 0.298 -0.908** 0.357
WARR x SQ 4.875* 2.701 3.663 2.612 5.402* 2.895 6.942* 3.691
PQ x SQ -26.718*** 6.593 -23.327*** 7.057 -20.770*** 7.074 -24.522*** 7.776
NDEALERS 0.201*** 0.057 0.249*** 0.064
Notes: (5): Including NDEALERS (number of franchised dealers, measured in 1000’s) in the model spec-
ification; (6) including both NDEALERS and brand age dummies; (7) Include brand dummies for all top
10 seller brands that have longitudinal variation in warranties; (8) Include brand dummies for all brands
that have longitudinal variation in warranties. *, **, ***, Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, confidence levels,
respectively.
nal variation in warranties (model 8). As can be seen in Table 6, our main results remain
remarkably robust, in particular, the significance of the interactions remains quite strong
(with the exception of WARR*SQ that in this case is significant only at the 10% level).
Overall, we believe that these robustness checks are useful in supporting our main results
to the extent possible with our data. In the case of the role of brand in particular, if more
granular data becomes available, e.g., at the dealer level, future research may further examine
our findings in more detail. For example, if variation in services across different dealers can
be exploited as a richer source of identification. More generally, our analysis is subject
to usual limitations encountered when dealing with observational data and identification
strategies based on instrumental variables. While it may be unrealistic to conduct controlled
field experiments in multi-firm and multi-year settings under competition like the one we
consider, perhaps future research could explore single-firm field experiments to test effects
similar to ours without the need to rely on instruments-based identification.
6. Conclusion
We formulate and estimate a model to study the impact of service attributes on demand,
and the moderating role of product quality in that relationship. We focus on after-sales
services, and characterize the service strategy of a firm by both its warranty length and its
after-sales service quality. Our results indicate that both service metrics are complementary,
i.e., the better the service quality of a brand, the higher the marginal effect of offering longer
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warranties on demand, and vice versa. Thus, these two service attributes reinforce each
other. In contrast, no complementarities are observed for service attributes and product
quality, and after-sales services play, rather, a compensatory role with respect to product
quality, i.e., the impact of both service variables on demand increases when product quality
decreases. Collectively, our results suggest that competing on after-sales services is more
effective (in terms of its effect on demand) for firms that have lower product quality, and
that a firm that increases its warranty length would benefit most by simultaneously investing
in improving its service quality if existing service quality is low.
These findings illustrate that firms would benefit by defining their product and service
strategies jointly rather than independently, i.e. they show that the joint consideration of
product and service is essential for the development of an effective competitive strategy.
In particular, the positioning of a firm with respect to product/service quality dimensions
directly influences the marginal effect of its warranty length on consumer demand. Our model
thus also provides a tool for managers to evaluate the impact of offering different warranty
lengths on consumer demand (for a given positioning in product quality and service quality),
which if complemented with actual warranty cost data (which are internally available), would
help companies to define optimal warranty levels. We believe that the demand-side estimates
derived from our analysis constitute a critical missing component for managerial decision-
making in practice, as managers are usually very good at estimating the implied costs of
different managerial interventions, while demand effects are much more difficult to isolate.
Our analysis of the service strategy of firms focused exclusively on the in-warranty period.
In practice, firm service strategies also include the out-of-warranty period, and the definition
of the warranty length could have implications in the profits that firms derive from selling
extended warranties. Modeling the interactions between in-warranty and out-of-warranty
policies offers an avenue for future research. Also, our identification strategy requires the
exogeneity of product quality and service quality in the demand specification, which, as
noted, is justified given our static model in which firms compete on prices and warranties only.
While appropriate to capture short-term effects, our model does not capture longer-term
dynamic aspects involved in firm decision-making and consumer demand. The formulation
of a dynamic model that endogenizes long-term effects of firm investment in product quality
and service quality is thus a natural -and much more complex- extension of our analysis.
Future research could also explore refinements to our model specifications. For example, the
incorporation of data on demographics would allow including non-linear income effects in
the model. Finally, to our knowledge this is the first paper to empirically study how firm
service strategies interact with product quality in a demand model of firm competition. The
formulation of similar studies in other manufacturing industries would allow for a broader
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understanding of the value of services as part of firms’ competitive strategies. We hope to
conduct further research in these areas.
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